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Three Arguments of “Right to Secession” 
in the Civil War: International Perspectives 
 
BY HAN LIU* 
 
Abstract 
 
Secession becomes a source of controversies again both within 
and outside the United States.  In both political discourse and public 
imagination, the image of secession of the South in the mid-
nineteenth century, as well as the Civil War it triggered, occupies an 
important position.  Conducted in blood, the end of the Civil War is 
usually thought to establish a constitutional rule that no state shall 
secede from the Union.  Challenging the conventional 
understanding, recent legal scholarship has shown that the 
legality/constitutionality of secession did not receive a definitive, 
legal answer at Appomattox.  But the question remains: Why so?  
Explaining the puzzle, this article traces out the debate over the 
“rights of secession” before and during the Civil War, putting it into 
contemporaneous international horizons.  It argues that, the Civil 
War cannot resolve the legality of secession because Southern 
secessionism actually resorted to not only legal/constitutional 
arguments, but also revolutionary and nationalistic justifications, 
both of which were extralegal.  The dispute eventually went to a 
violent solution, because secessionists, with these arguments, had 
already moved beyond the law.  In the contemporaneous legal 
imagination, secession belongs in the domain of sovereignty that 
involves war and violence, not the arena of law and the court. 
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In reality, if North and South formed two autonomous 
countries, like, for example, England and Hanover, their 
separation would be no more difficult than was the separation 
of England and Hanover.  “The South,” however, is neither a 
territory closely sealed off from the North geographically, nor 
a moral unity.  It is not a country at all, but a battle slogan. 
 —Karl Marx1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Secession becomes a source of political and legal controversies 
again.  As the specter of separatism continues to haunt the world in 
places like Scotland in the twenty-first century, the topic of secession 
has been rediscovered in American political discourse in recent 
years, across the political spectrum.  In 2010, in response to the 
Democratic administration, the former Governor of Texas Rick Perry 
mentioned the possibility of the secession of Texas from the United 
States.**  After Barack Obama’s reelection in 2012, Southern 
secessionism began to surge.2  In wake of the victory of Donald 
Trump in 2016, voices of seceding from the Union arose in several 
blue states, too.3  
As the issue has become increasingly serious in American 
politics, legal and academic discussions over the constitutionality of 
secession also rose.4  In the literature, as well as in American 
political discourse and public imagination, the image of secession of 
the South in the mid-nineteenth century, as well as the Civil War it 
triggered, occupies an important position.5  The Southern 
 
 1. KARL MARX & FREDRICK ENGELS, THE CIVIL WAR IN THE UNITED STATES, 75 (2003) 
(ebook). 
**Reid Wilson, In Texas, Ted Cruz Has Allies, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2013, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/10/22/in-texas-ted-cruz-has-allies. 
 2. Elizabeth Dias, Obama’s Re-Election Inspires Southern Secessionists, TIME (Nov. 
14, 2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/14/obamas-re-election-inspires-southern-
secessionists/. 
 3. Cristina Silva, Will California and Oregon Leave the Union? Facts about CalExit 
and Democrats’ ‘Secession Movement’, RAWSTORY (Nov. 12, 2016, 22:09), http://www. 
rawstory.com/2016/11/will-california-and-oregon-leave-the-union-facts-about-calexit-and-
democrats-secession-movement/. 
 4. See, e.g., NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2016). 
 5. See, e.g., GARY W. GALLAGHER, JUBAL A. EARLY, THE LOST CAUSE, AND CIVIL WAR 
3. Liu ‐ Three Arguments of Secession (1).docx  11/27/2017  11:13 AM 
56 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:1 
secessionist movement and its historical failure in the 1860s still 
haunts the American people today, especially those who oppose the 
federal government for various reasons.  Conducted in blood,6 the 
end of the Civil War is usually thought to establish a constitutional 
rule that no state shall secede from the Union.7  As the former Justice 
Antonin Scalia said, “[i]f there was any constitutional issue resolved 
by the Civil War, it is that there is no right to secede.”8 
Recent scholarship, however, has begun to challenge the 
conventional wisdom.9  Under the new understanding, the question 
of the constitutionality of secession did not receive a definitive, legal 
answer at Appomattox.10  The result of the Civil War merely 
answered the constitutional question by force, not by law.11  Legal 
answer requires more than brutal violence.  But the question remains 
˗ why so?  Why did the Civil War not settle the normative question of 
the right to secession?  
This article sets out to approach the question by tracing out the 
debate over the legitimacy of secession and putting them into 
contemporaneous international horizons.  It argues that the Civil War 
cannot resolve the question of the right to secession because Southern 
secessionism actually resorted to more than just legal/constitutional 
 
HISTORY: A PERSISTENT LEGACY (1995);  DAVID GOLDFIELD, STILL FIGHTING THE CIVIL WAR 
(2002). 
 6. See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 92 (2003) (“The Civil War was 
by far the bloodiest conflict in our history, with a death toll of six hundred thousand men. 
This nearly equals the total from all other wars combined. The statistics are appalling. One 
out of fifty Americans died in the Civil War, including a quarter of Southern white males of 
military age.”). 
 7. See, e.g., LAURENCE TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION (2008); Akhil Reed Amar, 
Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1512 n.341 (1987) (the “final military 
judgment [against the legality of secession] was entered at the Appomattox Courthouse”);  
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
691, 691 (2004). 
 8. See Ben Smith, Scalia: No to Secession, POLITICO: BEN SMITH BLOG, (Feb. 16, 
2010), http://www.politico.com/blogs/ben-smith/2010/02/scalia-no-to-secession-025119. 
 9. See, e.g., Cynthia Nicoletti, Did Secession Really Die at Appomattox?: The Strange 
Case of U.S. v. Jefferson Davis, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 587, 588 (2010) (“the civil war did not 
fully resolve the constitutionality of secession…”); Mark E. Brandon, Secession and 
Nullification in the Twenty-First Century, 67 ARK. L. REV. 91, 98 ̅ ̅ ̅ ̅ ̅ ̄ ̅ ̅ ̄ ̅–̅99 (2014) (“The Civil 
War did decide the secessions of 1861 as a matter of raw force; but it did not-it could not-
decide secession as a matter of constitutional authority.”). 
 10. See Cynthia Nicoletti, Did Secession Really Die at Appomattox?: The Strange Case 
of U.S. v. Jefferson Davis, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 587, 588 (2010). 
 11. See Mark E. Brandon, Secession and Nullification in the Twenty-First Century, 67 
ARK. L. REV. 91, 98̅ ̅–̄99 (2014). 
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arguments.  Rather, the normative, rights-based discourse of secession 
many Southern statesmen and theorists put forward comprised two 
more dimensions: the right to revolution and the right to national self-
determination.  The dispute was eventually resolved by war because 
secessionists had already moved beyond purely legal arguments and 
actions.  Hence the “right to secede” met the violent resistance of the 
democratic state.  In the legal theory of the day, secession belongs at the 
domain of sovereignty that involves war and violence, not the arena of 
law and the court.   
This article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes territorial 
aggregation and disaggregation in the post-revolutionary republican 
states – America and France.  Both countries followed the old-fashioned 
ways of accomplishing and justifying territorial acquisition.  Both, 
however, encountered problems of territorial unity after the principle of 
popular sovereignty was enshrined by revolution.  This was especially 
so in the United States, which faced secessionist instability after the 
Revolution.  Part II deals with the normative debates – constitutional, 
revolutionary, and nationalistic – over secession around the Civil War.  
Southern theorists claimed that secession is constitutional because of the 
compact nature of the Union, while the North countered that secession 
is unlawful because of the perpetuity and indivisibility of the Union.  
The South also argued that even if secession is unlawful, it can be 
justified by the right of revolution; the North held that the right of 
revolution must have a just cause and is only vindicated by victory.  
Finally, the South employed a national self-determination argument.  
That argument was marred by ethnic indistinctiveness and slavocratic 
politics in the South.  Part III shows that theory gave place to battle on 
the question of secession.  Post-Civil War Americans can only re-invoke 
the trial by battle and the right of conquest to make sense of the war and 
its answer to the question of secession. 
 
I.  Territorial Aggregation and Disaggregation Attempts in the 
Popular-Sovereign States 
 
The American experiment of republican constitutionalism can be 
put into the context of nineteenth-century world history.  Although 
the American and French Revolutions had introduced the principle of 
popular sovereignty to the world, the nineteenth century was 
emphatically an age of empires – a time in which imperial states 
reached their zenith.  Maximilian became emperor of Mexico, Queen 
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Victoria was proclaimed empress of India, the Meiji Restoration set 
out to create a Japanese empire, and European imperial powers 
claimed the African Continent, to name a few.12  Remarkably, even 
the new republican states of America and France followed the rules 
and employed the titles used by old, dynastic/colonial states.  The 
Confederate States of America’s dream of a Caribbean empire, as 
well as the American territorial expansion before and after the Civil 
War, cannot be understood fully and properly without this 
backdrop.13  The French Republic, too, maintained a large colonial 
empire.   
At the same time, within these new republics based on the 
principle of popular sovereignty, territorial unity became a problem.  
Post-revolutionary instability threatened the territorial unity of the 
popular-sovereign states.  This was especially so for the United 
States, a country founded upon the aggregation of formerly 
independent colonies.  The fledging republican state faced 
secessionist challenges even before the Civil War.   
 
A. E Pluribus Unum:  The Birth and Growth of the American  
 Union 
 
Before the American Revolution, a relatively big country was 
usually monarchical.  Republican forms of government had only 
appeared in city-states like Venice and Florence.  Thinking about 
republican regimes, Montesquieu argued that they must be small.14  
Either empire without liberty or liberty without empire; it was hard to 
have an empire of liberty.  Similarly, unity without equality or equality 
without unity; it was hard to have a unified state based on equality. 
The United States created something new.  The American 
Revolution transformed thirteen colonies into what the Declaration 
of Independence called “Free and Independent States.”  After the 
Revolution, these republican states first united under the Article of 
Confederation.  That Confederacy was less than satisfying, leading to 
 
 12. See FREDERICK COOPER, COLONIALISM IN QUESTION: THEORY, KNOWLEDGE, 
HISTORY 182 (2005). 
 13. See ROBERT E. MAY, THE SOUTHERN DREAM OF A CARIBBEAN EMPIRE 1854–1861 
(1973). 
 14. See CHARLES-LOUIS MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS VOL. I 150 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., 1766) [1902] (“It is natural to a republic to have only a small territory, 
otherwise it cannot long subsist.”). 
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the adoption of a constitution designed to create a “more perfect 
Union.”  Contrary to the conventional wisdom that a republic must 
be small, the founders endeavored to establish democratic self-
government in a large country.15  The constitutional framers took into 
consideration even the possibility of further territorial expansion.  
Thus, Article IV declares that: “New States may be admitted by the 
Congress into the Union.”  Strikingly, they made no similar provision 
for territorial disaggregation. 
The Union soon expanded its territory.  From its founding until 
the eve of the Civil War, several territorial acquisitions occurred.  In 
1803, the Louisiana Purchase was completed.  In 1819, Spain ceded 
Florida to the United States.  In 1845, Texas joined the Union.  In 
1848, the United States conquered the present-day southwestern 
United States in the Mexico-American War.  One should also not 
forget the annexation of the land of the Indians throughout the 
growth of the new republic.   
American territorial expansion carried various legal titles 
recognized by the international law of the day.  A prominent one 
was conquest.  This was especially notable in the acquisition of 
the land of the Indians.  Before the War of Independence, the 
settlers recognized the sovereignty and property rights of the 
Indians over their land – they usually purchased land from the 
Indians.  After the War, the federal government acquired their land 
by coercion, since “the Indians largely sided with the British in 
the war, and this fed opposition to Indian land rights of any kind.  
Indeed, the newly independent American colonies tried to claim 
that the Indians had lost all rights to their land as a result of the 
war.”16  In 1783, an emissary of the Continental Congress to the 
major Indian nations announced that: “As we are the conquerors, we 
claim the lands and property of all the white people as well as the 
Indians who have left and fought against us.”17  In appealing to a 
 
 15. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, 63 (James Madison).  See also GARY LAWSON & GUY 
SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL 
HISTORY 2 (2004) (“The founding generation was intensely interested in the geographic 
extent of the American polity.”); ROBERT KAGAN, DANGEROUS NATION: AMERICA’S PLACE 
IN THE WORLD FROM ITS EARLIEST DAYS TO THE DAWN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 76 
(2006) (“inducement to expansionism were embedded in the new republic’s legal and 
institutional structure.”). 
 16. KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG: THE EVOLUTION OF 
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 39 (2009). 
 17. STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND 112 (2005) (ebook). 
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right of conquest, the newly born United States was following its 
European elder brothers.  Another notable example of conquest 
was the result of the United States-Mexico War.  In 1848, the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo transferred a large tract of territory, 
which included California, Nevada, Utah, and potions of 
Wyoming, Colorado, Arizona, and New Mexico, from the defeated 
Mexico to the United States as spoils of the war.18  
Purchase was another way to acquire territory.  Louisiana 
(1803), Florida (1819), and Alaska (1867) were exemplary cases.  
Expansion through purchases comported with the dominant 
international order of that time.  These purchases were conducted 
with European powers– the French, Spanish, and Russian 
Empires, respectively.  They were possible because the Europe-
centered international society still treated territory as the property 
of the sovereign.  If an empire saw a part of its territory or 
possessions as useless or difficult to control, it tended to sell it.19  
Territorial transference was commonly framed as a proprietary 
transaction. 
Apart from conquest and treaty/purchase, the traditional title 
of discovery was also invoked.  When the United States acquired 
the Oregon Territory, which included the present-day states of 
Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and parts of Montana and Wyoming, 
the American claim chiefly relied on the doctrine of discovery.  
That legal claim was supposed to settle the boundary dispute with 
Great Britain over where to draw the line between the United 
States and Canada.  According to the international law of 
discovery of the day, the title of discovery, enjoyed by 
Christian/civilized nations, had two components: the act of 
discovery and the act of possession.  The United States claimed that, 
although the British were the first to reach the coast in 1778, the 
United States was the first to reach the Columbia River in 1792, 
which grounded its claim to the basin drained by the river, under 
accepted principles of discovery in the eighteenth century.20  This 
 
 18. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 2, 1848, art. V, 9 Stat. 922. 
 19. In 1803, for example, when Napoleon Bonaparte thought it was difficult and 
unworthy to sustain France’s control in Louisiana, he decided to sell it to the United States.  
See GEORGE HERRING, FROM COLONY TO SUPERPOWER: U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 
1776 106 (2008). 
 20. See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL 
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 2, 97 (2004). 
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“discovery” of the Oregon Territory was coupled with actual 
occupation by exploration and settlement during the early nineteenth 
century.21  Great Britain accepted the United States’ claim based on 
the doctrine of discovery.22  
Despite the absence of international legal problems, American 
territorial expansion triggered questions of constitutionality.  The 
Louisiana Purchase, the largest addition to territory of the United 
States throughout its history, was the earliest and most typical 
example.  Thomas Jefferson, under whose presidency the Purchase 
was completed, was unsure of the constitutionality of such a 
purchase.  He thought that it went beyond the constitutional powers 
of the government and required a constitutional amendment.23  He 
drafted two proposed amendments to clarify the constitutionality of 
the Purchase, but ultimately recognized that constitutional 
amendment was too difficult a task for such an important and urgent 
political decision.24  Accordingly, he fell back on political necessity 
to dispel his constitutional worries: “It will be desirable for Congress 
to do what is necessary in silence”.25   
Jefferson was perhaps the last prominent statesman who had 
constitutional qualms about territorial expansion.  “To be sure, the 
debate over the constitutionality of territorial acquisition faded 
quickly after 1804.”26  Shortly after the acquisition of Florida, Chief 
Justice Marshall emphatically affirmed the constitutionality of 
territorial expansion: “the Constitution confers absolutely on the 
government of the Union, the powers of making war, and of making 
treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of 
acquiring territory, either by conquest or treaty.”27  “By the 1850s 
Congress even authorized the acquisition of uninhabited high seas 
 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. LAWSON, supra note 21. (“The general [federal] government has no powers but such 
as the constitution has given it; and it has not given it a power of holding foreign territory, 
and still less of incorporating it in the Union. An amendment of the constitution seems 
necessary for this.”). 
 24. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 17, at 37. 
 25. Sanford Levinson, Installing the Insular Cases into the Canon, in FOREIGN IN A 
DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAN EXPANSION, AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina 
Burnett & Burke Marshall eds., 2001). 
 26. RAUSTIALA, supra note 17, at 38.  
 27. American Ins. Co. v. 365 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828) (emphasis 
added). 
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‘guano’ islands . . . Amazingly, some seventy such far-flung islands 
were acquired by the United States under this act.”28 
In both ways, conquest and purchase/treaty, the United States 
did not ask for the consent of the population in incorporated 
territories.  The principle of popular sovereignty that guided the new 
republic’s domestic politics did not yet apply to territorial change 
among sovereign states.  The new republic, it turns out, was as 
interested in territorial aggrandizement as traditional European 
empires.  Neither international law nor constitutional law of the day 
hindered the expansionist ambition of the new republic.  Instead, 
they facilitated it.   
 
B. A Secessionist Nation: Revolutionary Beginning and  
    Antebellum Attempts 
 
The political experiment of the United States began with a 
republican revolution.  The American Revolution rejected both a 
monarch and the idea of a monarchical regime.  It not only terminated 
the British imperial rule in the territories that later became America.  It 
also repudiated the divine right of kings.  Famously, it proclaimed “All 
men are created equal.”  The event of 1776 differed from previous 
revolts against monarchs in the Old World (e.g., the Dutch Revolt in 
1580) in that it denied kingship per se, not just the abuse of that 
position.   
In fact, the American Revolution was an act of secession, or a 
colonial revolution.29  A revolution, in the ordinary sense, overthrows 
the past government and establishes a new one, but does not alter 
the territorial extent of the state.  Secession does not aim to 
overthrow the current government but rather to leave it.  
Revolutionaries aspire to control the whole territory of a state;30 
secessionists only want to have part of the territory.  The 
Declaration of Independence was first and foremost both an act of 
and a justification for secession: Political authority must be based 
 
 28. RAUSTIALA, supra note 17, at 38. 
 29. Some historians even take the American Revolution as a civil war within the British 
Empire.  See e.g., David Armitage, Secession and Civil War, in SECESSION AS AN 
INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENON (Don Doyle ed., 2011). 
 30. I suspend the question of transnational revolution as in the South American 
Revolutions in the early nineteenth century or world revolution as anticipated by Lenin or 
Mao in the twentieth century.  
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on the consent of the governed; if the people or part of the people 
find the ruler insufferable, they can step out of the government, by 
emigration or secession.  When the South invoked the Declaration 
of Independence to justify its withdrawal from the Union, it was 
resorting to the founding principle of America.31  
A country created by a revolution always faces the possibility 
of a subsequent revolution.32  A political community resulting 
from an act of secession always faces the threat of a subsequent 
secession.33  Such revolutionary/secessionary instability permeates 
the constitutional history of America.34  In the early republic, 
when the memory of the Revolution was still fresh, people tended 
to think that if a group of people were unsatisfied with the 
political authority, they could withdraw from the political 
community.35  “The principles of our Revolution [in 1776] point to 
the remedy – a separation,” wrote Pickering, the chief promoter of the 
secession of New England in the next few years.36  Both the North and 
the South were heirs of the American secessionist revolutionaries.   
Secession was therefore far from a taboo during the post-
Revolutionary period.  Thomas Jefferson said in his First Inaugural 
Address in 1801: “If there be any among us who wish to dissolve the 
Union or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed 
. . .”37 Thinking about the secessionist movements in New England 
(which will be discussed below), Jefferson wrote in 1816: “If any state 
 
 31. See infra, Part II.B. 
 32. China, for example, had the Second Revolution in 1913 after the Xinhai Revolution 
in 1911, which ended monarchical regime of thousands of years.  See YONGLE ZHANG, JIU 
BANG XIN ZAO, 1911-1917 [THE REMAKING OF AN OLD COUNTRY] (2011). 
 33. See BUCKNER F. MELTON, AARON BURR: CONSPIRACY TO TREASON 45 (2002) 
(“Throughout much of American history, from the very beginning, in fact, when 
geographical minorities had problems with federal laws, they often talked of secession.”). 
 34. See PAUL KAHN, SACRED VIOLENCE: TORTURE, TERROR AND SOVEREIGNTY 123–26 
(2008) (on the rhythm of American political life); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE 
FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 
(2005). 
 35. Think of the extension of the frontier before the Civil War, which shows that 
unsatisfied people could literally leave.  Many Americans went to the Oregon Territory and 
established a provisional government there before it was incorporated into the United States. 
See Oregon History: The “Oregon Question” and Provisional Government, Oregon 
Bluebook, http://bluebook.state.or.us/cultural/history/history10.htm. 
 36. Letter from Pickering to Cabot, (Jan. 29, 1804), IN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NEW 
ENGLAND FEDERALISM 1800-1815 339 (Henry Adams ed., 1877) (ebook). 
 37. Thomas Jefferson, Inaugural Address (March 4, 1801), in THE INAUGURAL 
ADDRESSES OF PRESIDENT THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1801 AND 1805, 5 (Cunningham ed., 2001). 
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in the Union will declare that it prefers separation . . . to a continuance 
in union . . . I have no hesitation in saying, ‘let us separate.’”38  
William Rawle, once the United States district attorney for 
Pennsylvania under the Washington administration, wrote in 1825 that 
the people of a state retain the sovereign power to change the federal 
Constitution, including the right to secede from the Union.  He 
discussed the question whether a state could erect a hereditary 
monarchy and answered with a yes: To do that, however, the state 
should secede from the Union for the Constitution of the Union 
required every state to be republican.39  Foreign observers also found 
that the principles of the American federal government supported the 
legitimacy of secession.  The French political philosopher Alexis de 
Tocqueville, for example, wrote in the 1830s:  
 
The Union was formed by the voluntary agreement of the 
States; and in uniting together they have not forfeited their 
nationality, nor have they been reduced to the condition of one 
and the same people.  If one of the States chooses to withdraw 
from the compact, it would be difficult to disprove its right of 
doing so, and the Federal Government would have no means 
of maintaining its claims directly either by force or right.40 
 
While the Constitution touched upon the issue of territorial 
acquisition, it said nothing explicitly about secession.  The Founding 
Fathers did not even take up this issue at the Philadelphia 
Convention.41  That may be because in the process of centralization 
through a new constitution, discussing secession was practically 
unnecessary or politically unsuitable.42  The constitutional silence on 
the issue of secession, for many, meant that at least constitutional 
 
 38. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W. Crawford, (Jun. 20, 1816), in The WRITINGS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON Vol. 15, 29 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1905) (ebook). 
 39. See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
295–96 (1825). 
 40. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA VOL. I 387 (Henry Reeve trans., 1900). 
 41. See FRANK DONOVAN, MR. MADISON’S CONSTITUTION – THE STORY BEHIND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 123 (1965) (“As a glaring instance, the question of whether a 
state might dissolve its connection with the Union was not even mentioned in all the debate 
in Philadelphia.”). 
 42. See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 206 (1913) 
(“It would have been inexpedient to have forced [the issue of state’s rights in the forms of nullification 
and secession] in 1787, when the fate of any sort of a central government was doubtful.”). 
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norm does not forbid secession.   
Thus it is little wonder that the problem of secession did not 
arise only in the South.  It arose in the North well before the Civil 
War.  In the early 1800s, the New England Federalists attempted to 
step out of the federal constitutional order and found a separate 
confederacy.  The Northern people, who lost their political 
ascendency in national politics in 1800, wanted to employ secession 
as a remedy.  Nearly thirty years before the South Carolina 
nullification crisis, which relied upon John Calhoun’s theory, “the 
New England Federalists were out-Calhouning Calhoun.”43  To go 
into some details about the New England secessionism will help us 
understand the dynamics of disunion in a republican, constitutional 
order birthed by secessionist movements and based on free election. 
The presidential election of 1800 changed the political blueprint 
the Constitution of 1787 had sketched.  For the Federalists, the rise 
of Jeffersonian, plebscibitarian democracy ran against their ideal of 
Anglo representative aristocracy.44 The two parties, the Federalists 
and the Democratic-Republicans, represented two conflicting 
political ideologies.  In Jefferson’s eyes, “the Federalists were a body 
of Anglo-Monarchic-Aristocrats, and himself and his friends were 
Republicans.”45  To the New England Federalists, “the great 
governing principle of Mr.  Jefferson’s political conduct . . .  was 
friendship for France and enmity to Great Britain.”46  New England 
Federalists declared that the Democratic-Republican administrations 
betrayed the spirit of the American Revolution and the 
Constitution.47  In their eyes, the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 
changed the balance between the North and the South.48  The 
 
 43. Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Yankee Confederates: New England Secession Movements Prior to the 
War Between the States, in SECESSION, STATE & LIBERTY 142 (David Gordon ed., 1998) (ebook). 
 44. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON, 
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 3–6 (2005). 
 45. THEODORE DWIGHT, HISTORY OF THE HARTFORD CONVENTION 25 (1833) (ebook). 
 46. ACKERMAN, supra note 45. 
 47. See CHARLES R. BROWN, THE NORTHERN CONFEDERACY 38 (Oct. 1915) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University) (on file with the Library of Congress) (describing that 
Timothy Pickering, the chief projector of the Northern Confederacy, accused Jefferson of betrayal 
of the Revolution). 
 48. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 465 (Gales and Seaton ed., 1832) (Griswold, Representative 
from Connecticut, said in the House of Representatives, October, 1803: “The vast and 
unmanageable extent which the accession of Louisiana will give the United States; the 
consequent dispersion of our population, and the destruction of that balance of power which is so 
important to maintain between the Eastern and Western States, threatens, at no distant day, the 
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embargo declared by Jefferson in 1807 and James Madison’s Non-
Intercourse Act of 1809 made New England uncomfortable.49  In the 
War of 1812 against the old enemy – the British Empire – the 
Federalists claimed that they suffered from the calling up of the 
State’s militias and the collection of taxes used for the War.   
Some Federalist politicians of New England decided that their 
states should take New England out of the Union.  Timothy Pickering 
expressed this attempt and its justification:  
 
I will . . . anticipate a new confederacy, exempt from the 
corrupt and corrupting influence and oppression of the 
aristocratic Democrats of the South.  There will be . . .  a 
separation.  . . .  The British Provinces, even with the assent 
of Britain, will become members of the Northern 
confederacy.  . . .  The principles of our Revolution point to 
the remedy, – a separation.  . . .The people of the East cannot 
reconcile their habits, views, and interests with those of the 
South and West.50  
 
Pickering gained support from other New England Federalists.51 
 
subversion of our Union.”  Plumer of New Hampshire, declared in the Senate: “[a]dmit this 
Western World into the Union and you destroy, at once the weight and importance of the Eastern 
States, and compel them to establish a separate and independent empire.”); BROWN, supra note 
39, at 32 (“The advocates … argued their position that Massachusetts was in danger; that her 
sovereignty and her independence were swiftly and surely being taken away; that the power of 
the South over the North was due to slaves and that a crisis was at hand.  Thus the sons of 
Massachusetts argued that separation was the only means of preserving their independence.”). 
 49. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM 1800-1815 25 (Henry Adams 
ed., 1877) (ebook) (Jefferson recollected Adams: “He urged that a continuance of the embargo 
much longer would certainly be met by forcible resistance, supported by the legislature, and 
probably by the judiciary, of the State; that, to quell that resistance, if force should be resorted to 
by the government, it would produce a civil war …”). 
 50. Letter from Timothy Pickering to George Cabot (Dec. 24, 1803), in DOCUMENTS 
RELATING TO NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM 1800-1815 339 (Henry Adams ed., 1877) (ebook) 
(emphasis added). 
 51. See, LEONARD BACON, SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF HON. JAMES 
HILLHOUSE OF NEW HAVEN (1860) (quoting Senator James Hillhouse: “The Eastern states must 
and will dissolve the Union and form a separate government.”); EDWARD P. POWELL, 
NULLIFICATION AND SECESSION IN THE UNITED STATES 128 (2004), (Judge Reeve of 
Connecticut wrote to Tracy in Congress, “I have seen many of our friends; and all that I have 
seen, and most that I have heard from, believe that we must separate…”).  WILLIAM PLUMER 
JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 298 (1857) (“I recollect and am certain,” says Plumer, “that on 
returning early one evening from dining with Aaron Burr, Mr. Hillhouse, after saying to me 
that New England had no influence in the Government added that, ‘The Eastern States must 
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New England secessionism culminated in the Hartford Convention in 
1815.52  “The Convention was not a mere product of the war of 1812, 
because we recognize in these grievances the very earliest, as well 
the latest, grounds of the [Federalist] conspiracies.”53  Most of the 
delegates to the Convention intended to cause New England to 
separate from the Union.54  Public opinion of New England at the time 
also cried for secession.55  Some New Englanders even attempted to 
keep neutral between the United States and the British Empire during 
the War of 1812.56  
The Hartford Convention was a striking example of a secessionist 
attempt in the early American Republic.  Yet it was not the only one.  
There were two other examples, one before, the other after.  The first 
was from the West, and known as the “Burr Conspiracy.”  From 1804 to 
1806, former Vice President Aaron Burr tried to separate the Southwest 
from the United States.  Losing opportunities in the East, Burr turned to 
the West.  His plan eventually failed and he was tried for treason.57  A 
second one was from the North again.  In the 1840s, Garrisonian 
abolitionists tried to preserve the purity of the American polity by 
 
and will dissolve the Union, and form a separate government, and the sooner the better.’”). 
 52. WILLIAM PLUMER JR., LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 404 (1857) (The first mention of such 
a convention was in 1808-09). 
 53. BROWN, supra note 48, at 113. 
 54. See Documents Relating to New England Federalism 56, 221, 238, 245, 265 (ebook); 
PLUMER JR., supra note 53, at 420 (Plumer told his friend about the Hartford Convention: “The 
prime object is to effect a revolution, a dismemberment of the Union. Some of the members for 
more than ten years, have considered such a measure necessary.  Of this I have conclusive 
evidence.”). 
 55. See Boston Centinel, May 26, 1813, quoted from JAMES BANNER, TO THE HARTFORD 
CONVENTION 313(1970) (“The determination that was necessary in 1776 is necessary now.”); 
THE BALTIMORE FEDERAL REPUBLICAN., Nov. 17, 1814, quoted from BROWN, supra note 48, at 
110. 
 56. Letter from William B. Giles to the “Richmond Enquirer” (Oct. 24, 1828) in 
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO NEW ENGLAND FEDERALISM 29, 30 (Adams once told Jefferson 
“that he had information of the most unquestionable certainty, that certain citizens of the 
Eastern States (I think he named Massachusetts particularly) were in negotiation with agents 
of the British government, the object of which was an agreement that the New England States 
should take no further part in the war then going on; that, without formally declaring their 
separation from the Union of the States, they should withdraw from all aid and obedience to 
them ...” (emphasis original)) (ebook). 
 57. See BUCKNER F. MELTON, AARON BURR: CONSPIRACY TO TREASON (2002); WALTER 
F. MCCALEB, AARON BURR CONSPIRACY: A HISTORY LARGELY FROM ORIGINAL AND 
HITHERTO UNUSED SOURCES (1903); THOMAS P. ABERNETHY, THE BURR CONSPIRACY 
(1968). 
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urging northern free states to leave southern slavery states.58  William L. 
Garrison, joined by a number of abolitionists, declared that, “we ought 
to have laid before the slaveholders, long ago, this alternative.  You must 
abolish slavery, or we shall dissolve the Union.”59  The Garrisonian 
abolitionists gave more weight to liberty than to unity.60  
All three cases demonstrate the secessionist tradition of America: 
political leaders who lost power in the democratic, majoritarian political 
process resort to secession to create new opportunities.  The 
constitutional silence on secession and the secessionist attempts in the 
North provided the historical and ideological background for the 
disunionist efforts of the South decades later.  In 1860, when the South 
perceived the threat of Northern dominance, they followed the 
secessionist precedents of the first half of the nineteenth century.  After 
Lincoln was elected, seven southern states – South Carolina, 
Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas – seceded 
from the Union and formed the Confederate States of America.  And 
Lincoln worried that eight remaining states – Maryland, Delaware, 
Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Missouri 
– would follow them.  But unlike the precedents, a devastating civil war 
followed the secessionist attempt of the Southern states.   
 
C. A Comparison: Territorial Unity in the French  
    Republic(s) 
 
France also experienced a republican revolution at the end of 
the eighteenth century.  But unlike the United States, post-
Revolutionary French republican regimes were discontinuous and 
unstable during the nineteenth century.  In that century, France 
experienced several nonrepublican phases, i.e., Empires and 
Restorations.  Republican regimes seemed an exception to the old 
regime not only in terms of number but also in terms of 
temporality.  The French Republic had three short lives during the 
nineteenth century: the First from 1792-1804, the Second from 
 
 58. See Betram Wyatt-Brown, William Lloyd Garrison and Antislavery Unity: A 
Reappraisal, 13 CIVIL WAR HIST. 1, 5–24 (1967); LEWISH PERRY, RADICAL ABOLITIONISM: 
ANARCHY AND THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD IN ANTISLAVERY THOUGHT 159–66 (1978). 
 59. W. Caleb McDaniel, Repealing Unions: American Abolitionists, Irish Repeal, and 
the Origins of Garrisonian Disunion, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC, n.1 (2008). 
 60. See id. at 243–69. 
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1848-1852, and the Third from 1870 on.   
In terms of territoriality, France was already quite centralized 
before the French Revolution.61  Unlike the United States, it was 
an old state established by territorial aggregation through dynastic 
means.62  A little before the Revolution, France’s political map 
became quite the same as we know today.  Yet the feudal heritage, 
local differentiation, plural administrative boundaries, and 
ecclesiastical regions coexisted with the central government.  
Again, the divine body of the King linked these subdivisions into a 
single whole. 
The French Revolution threatened national unity.  The 
Revolution replaced the King with the popular sovereign.  The 
will of people was to reign.  Yet it was hard for statesmen to agree 
upon what exactly was the people’s will: Did popular sovereignty 
mean the people of France as a whole or the aggregation of the 
peoples at provincial levels? Could the majority of Parisians 
represent the popular sovereign? The ambiguity of the locus of 
popular sovereignty had the capacity to break the state into 
multiple small republics.  Indeed, from Lyon to Caen, some 
remarkable local rebellions against Paris occurred in 1792-1793 
after King Louis XIV’s execution, which contemporaries and 
historians called the “Federalist Revolt.”63  The Reign of Terror, 
after the Revolution, finally repressed these revolts and 
consolidated the unitary structure of the French state.   
The French established territorial unity under a new principle 
– nationality.64  Political communities within the territory of 
 
 61. See David Armitage et al., Interchange: Nationalism and Internationalism in the 
Era of the Civil War, 98 J. AME. HIST. 2, 474 (2011) (Jay Sexton) (“The establishment of 
central state power and its continuous consolidation proceeded quite differently in Europe 
than in the United States.  Whereas in the United States the relatively early establishment of 
a participatory democracy prevented a centralized and powerful state, in Europe central state 
power was established before participatory elements were incorporated into the nation-
state.”). 
 62. Brittany, for example, was annexed to France through the marriage between Charles 
VIII, the King of France, and Anne, the heiress of Brittany, in 1491.  See SAMUEL CLARK, 
STATE AND STATUS: THE RISE OF THE STATE AND ARISTOCRATIC POWER IN WESTERN EUROPE 
124 (1995). 
 63. See PAUL R. HANSON, THE JACOBIN REPUBLIC UNDER FIRE: THE FEDERALIST 
REVOLT IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (2003). 
 64. See FRANS SCHRIJVER, REGIONALISM AFTER REGIONALISATION: SPAIN, FRANCE, AND 
THE UNITED KINGDOM 172 (2006) (“Based on the thoughts of Rousseau, the French 
Revolution transferred the monarch to the people, that is the nation.  This established the 
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France were now united into a single concept of “the nation.”  The 
nation bracketed all historical traditions and local cultures; it 
transcended both the sum of members and their representation by 
government.  The general will of the whole people made “the 
Republic One and Indivisible.”65  “This was in strong contrast 
with the practice of dynastic acquirements and losses of state 
territory, as illustrated by the provision in the 1793 Constitution 
not to agree to peace with enemy states occupying any areas of the 
Republic’s territory.”66  French civic nationalism implied both the 
unity of the state and resistance to foreign rule.67  The sacred 
nation replaced the King’s body.68  Constitutionally, sovereignty 
lay in the people as a whole nation, not in the peoples at the local 
level.69 
Policies followed ideas.  Uniform institutions like a national 
calendar, the civil law system (Code Civil), and administrative 
dominance followed the idea of a unitary nation.  The Code Civil based 
the power of the state on the liberty of individuals, not on intermediate 
political organizations (e.g., the states in America).  New, uniform, 
territorial administrative divisions replaced the local privileges and 
identities of the old provinces and thereby diminished the centrifugal 
force of local politics.70  Enclaves were intentionally reduced.71  The 
 
idea of a nation as a popular political entity possessing a state, and created an explicit link 
between nation and territory.”). 
 65. See 1793 CONST. (Fr.), available at http://chnm.gmu.edu/revolution/d/430/. 
 66. SCHRIJVER, supra note 65, at 172 (2006). 
 67. See LORD ACTON, Nationality, in THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM AND OTHER ESSAYS 
287–88 (John N. Figgis & Reginald V. Laurence eds., 1907) (“The theory of nationality is 
involved in the democratic theory of the sovereignty of the general will. ... To have a 
collective will, unity is necessary, and independence is requisite in order to assert it. Unity 
and nationality are still more essential to the notion of the sovereignty of the people than the 
cashiering of monarchs, or the revocation of laws.”). 
 68. See LIAH GREENFELD, NATIONALISM: FIVE ROADS TO MODERNITY 155 (1992) (“The 
effect of the idea of the nation was analogous to that of the doctrine of Divine Right: like the 
latter, it both caused and signified a dramatic alteration in the meaning of French identity 
and soon changed the reality of the French polity”). 
 69. THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND CITIZEN, art. 3, Aug. 26, 1793 (“All 
sovereignty resides essentially in the Nation.  No body, no individual can exercise authority 
which does not explicitly emanate from it.”). 
 70. See SCHRIJVER, supra note 65, at 173 (“A new ‘equal’ and strictly functional 
division of France was meant to achieve a more united single French nation.”). 
 71. See J. H. W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: STATE 
TERRITORY 445 (1970) (“[I]n the days of the French Revolution the foreign enclaves were 
… incorporated into the new unitary state ….”). 
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professional civil service system, created by Napoleon in the 1800s and 
free from local political influence, greatly helped maintain territorial 
unity and stability.72  In contrast, the United States didn’t establish such 
a system until 1871 and it didn’t become professionalized until 1883.73 
Republican France not only preserved but also augmented its 
territorial extent.  For many prominent French leaders of the First 
Republic such as Napoleon, a republican empire was not a contradiction 
in terms.  With the success of the Revolutionary Wars against coalitions 
of European monarchs, France gained new territories from the old 
dynastic states, such as Avignon (1791), Savoy (1792), Nice (1793), the 
Austrian Netherlands (1795), the Prince-Bishopric of Liege (1795), the 
German states on the left bank of the Rhine (1797), and Geneva (1798).  
Of course, it only held them for little more than a blink of the eye – 
most of the acquired territories were lost at the Congress of Vienna in 
1815.   
To be sure, French leaders proclaimed the high-minded principle 
of self-determination, as a corollary to popular sovereignty.74 Yet, 
practice hardly followed that principle.  First, that principle was 
employed only to “justify the annexation of lands belonging to other 
sovereigns.”75  “Plebiscites were held and the territories were 
annexed in accordance with the populations’ express desire to unite 
with France.”76  When the vote did not favor France, plebiscites were 
denied as invalid.77  Second, political expediency and military 
necessity soon took the place of the idea of popular self-
determination in the wars of expansion.  “The way was paved for 
Napoleon, and by the time of his advent and his triumph the 
campaign of forcing other people to be free had begun in earnest.  
Except for the treaties of union of the little republics of Mulhausen 
 
 72. See SCHRIJVER, supra note 65, at 173. 
 73. The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, 22, Stat. 403 (1883). 
 74. See SARAH WAMBAUGH, A MONOGRAPH ON PLEBISCITES 5–6 (1920) (The 
“renunciation of conquest is the key to the history of the doctrine during the Revolution. 
Convinced of the ethical and practical value of the renunciation, the Constituent Assembly 
made every effort to act in consistency with it, and when later events had led the French 
Armies far beyond the borders of the Republics, the Convention in Paris still made vain 
efforts to keep its faith with principle by asserting that the wars were not for conquest, and 
that all peoples should be free to choose their own sovereignty.”). 
 75. ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 12 
(1996). 
 76. Id.   
 77. Id.   
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and of Geneva with France, in which the annexations are based on 
the votes of the inhabitants, we hear no further echo of the right of 
self-determination.”78  The old-fashioned idea of conquest was 
revived. 
One should not forget that France was also a colonial empire.  
The republican transition did not change its imperial nature in terms 
of overseas territories.  Outside of the metropolitan area, both 
secession and aggregation transpired.  With the Revolution, France 
lost its richest and most important colony – Saint-Domingue.  
Inspired by the revolutionary idea of equal rights of man, the Haitian 
Revolution in 1791 overthrew French colonial rule and founded the 
Haiti Republic in 1804.79  Territorial aggregation also continued.  
During the First Republic, France tried to establish a colony in Egypt 
without success.80  The Third Republic carried on the republican 
imperial project with a mission to civilize the uncivilized world.81  
Actually, during the Third Republic, the French Colonial Empire 
reached its zenith: from Indochina to Congo, the French flag 
fluttered over Asia and Africa.  The principles of self-
determination and consent did not apply to uncivilized, colonial 
peoples. 
Similarities between the French and American Republics are 
clear.  First, both republics followed the practice and observed the 
rules of territorial aggregation shared by dynastic, imperial 
powers.  France carried on a project of republican empire, both 
continental and colonial.  The United States did that too: territorial 
expansion in North America and overseas acquisition in the 
Caribbean and the Pacific, especially during the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  Principles of popular sovereignty guided only 
their internal politics, not their international practice of territorial 
change.  Consent played little role in territorial acquisition and 
transference.  Second, both states encountered the problem of 
territorial unity in their internal, republican politics.  While 
 
 78. See WAMBAUGH, supra note 66, at 9. 
 79. See THEOPHILUS G. STEWARD, THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION, 1791-1804: OR, SIDE 
LIGHTS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1914). 
 80. See JUAN COLE, NAPOLEON’S EGYPT: INVADING THE MIDDLE EAST (2008). 
 81. See ALICE L. CONKLIN, A MISSION TO CIVILIZE: THE REPUBLICAN IDEA OF EMPIRE IN 
FRANCE AND WEST AFRICA, 1895-1930 (1997) (arguing that ideas of civilization encouraged 
colonial policy makers and governors to obscure the fundamental contradictions between 
universal “the rights of man” guaranteed in a republican democracy and the coercive 
acquisition of an empire that violates those rights). 
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territorial aggregation was not problematic to the two new 
republican states, the possibility of disintegration was a huge 
problem.   
France differed from the United State in several aspects.  
First, France had largely completed its territorial aggregation 
before the French Revolution; the Revolution merely replaced the 
King with the People/Nation.  Second, in contrast to the American 
idea of a constitutional compact, France arrived at the notion of 
social contract that generated a unitary nation.  A constitutional 
compact is agreed upon by states, while a social contract is based 
on individuals.  Third, French nationalism, birthed by popular 
sovereignty, overpowered federalism and grounded the unitary 
structure of state.  It took a much longer time for the United States 
to achieve a certain extent of national unity.  The American Civil 
War occupied a central place in that historical transformation.  By 
contrast, France resolved the question of territorial 
sovereignty/unity before the republican revolution and therefore 
did not have to subject the question to principled examination and 
debate. 
 
II. “The Right to Secession”: Debating the Legitimacy of  
Secession 
 
A. Constitutional Arguments and Narratives of the Union  
 
The disunion attempt of the South in 1860 generated a 
constitutional crisis in America.  It tested the endurance of the American 
republican, constitutional experiment in a world of empires.82  Can a 
constitutional, republican polity preserve itself?83  Can a republic of law 
 
 82. The question, in Lincoln’s words, was “whether that nation, or any nation so 
conceived [in liberty] and so dedicated [to the proposition that all men are created 
equal], can long endure.” See Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, available at, 
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/document_data/pdf/doc_036.pdf. 
 83. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861, in 4 
COLLECTED WORKS 421, 426 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (“It presents to the whole family 
of man, the question, whether a constitutional republic, or a democracy…can, or 
cannot, maintain its territorial integrity, against its own domestic foes. … It forces us to 
ask: ‘Is there, in all republics, this inherent, and fatal weakness?’  ‘Must a government, 
of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain 
its own existence?”). 
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employ violent means to maintain its existence?84  Slavery was an 
important factor in the cause and perhaps in the end of the war, yet it 
was an issue separate from secession.  The slavery problem could have 
led to other scenarios: for example, to formal legal abolition, as in the 
British West Indies, or a slave revolution, as in Haiti.  In America, it 
generated an existential crisis of the Union, the possibility of collapse.  
This path of course makes sense in light of the structural place of 
secession in the American project as I described above. 
The “house” was not only “divided” on the issue of slavery, but 
also on the constitutionality of secession.  On secession, perhaps the 
most important issue in American constitutional law, the Constitution 
was silent.85  Americans had been engaged in a civil war of 
constitutional arguments long before the Civil War.  The debate over the 
legitimacy of secession reflected the relocation of sovereignty in 
America.  In the English tradition, sovereignty lay in the government—
parliamentary sovereignty.86  But in America, sovereignty was located 
in the people, a collective, intergenerational entity, prior to and separate 
from the government.87  Thus, the question arose: Was the United States 
based on the people as a whole or on the several peoples of the states? 
The North held that the American Union constituted a true, indivisible 
nation; the South held that it was but a league of sovereign states.88  
 
 84. The Civil War, for Lincoln, was first and foremost a war over the endurance of the 
Union.  See Abraham Lincoln, Letter to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862, in SPEECHES AND 
WRITINGS 1859-1865 358 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (“My paramount object in this 
struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery.  If I could save 
the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the 
slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would 
also do that.  What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to 
save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save 
the Union.”). 
 85. See Akhil Amar, An Open Letter to Professors Paulsen and Powell, 115 YALE 
L.J. 8, 2105–06 (2005-6) (“[T]he legality or illegality of secession was probably the 
most serious constitutional question ever to arise in America.”); Susan-Mary Grant, 
“How a Free People Conduct a Long War”:  Sustaining Opposition to Secession in the 
American Civil War, in SECESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENON 134 (Don 
Doyle ed., 2010) (“The Constitution offered no help, being as it was silent on this most 
crucial point.”). 
 86. See e.g., ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (1915). 
 87. See Akhil Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1432–37 
(1987). 
 88. See STEPHEN NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 7–15 (2010). 
3. Liu ‐ Three Arguments of Secession (1).docx  11/27/2017  11:13 AM 
2017] Three Arguments of “Right to Secession”  75 
Secession, for the Southern disunionists and their theorists, was a 
constitutional right.  It was, for them, a matter of law.  Jefferson Davis 
said: “The right of secession is not something . . . outside of and 
antagonistic to the Constitution.  . . . if the right to secede is not 
prohibited to the States, and no power to prevent it expressly delegated 
to the United States, it remains as reserved to the States or the people, 
from whom all the powers of the General Government were derived.”89  
For Davis, the view that the Constitution created a national government 
rather than a compact of sovereign states was simply false.90  Alexander 
Stephens, the Vice President of the Confederate States of America 
during the Civil War, expressed similar arguments.91 
The purported constitutional right of secession relied on a compact 
theory of the Union.92  The Constitution, under this theory, was both a 
compact among independent states to create a federal government and a 
charter to specify and limit the powers of that government.93  If a party 
or several parties violated the compact, other parties had the legal right 
to dissolve or terminate that compact and therewith disunite the Union.  
Since the Northern states were regarded by the Southerners as violating 
the Constitution in their refusal to enforce the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850,94 the Southern states could leave the Union.95  Several Southern 
states highlighted the Northern states’ constitutional violations in their 
 
 89. JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 168 
(1958)[1881]. 
 90. See Jefferson Davis, Message of April 29, 1861 to the Provisional Congress, in 
THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF JEFFERSON DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERACY, INCLUDING 
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, 1861-1865 1: 63–65 (James D. Richardson ed., 1966). 
 91. See ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS, A CONSTITUTIONAL VIEW OF THE LATE WAR 
BETWEEN THE STATES: ITS CAUSES, CHARACTER, CONDUCT AND RESULTS (2 Vols., 1868-
70). 
 92. See STEPHEN NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 7 (2010) (“The supporters of the Confederacy adamantly maintained that the secession 
of the Southern states in 1860-1861 was a lawful act.  This insistence was rooted in a 
particular view of the legal nature of the federal union—specifically, on the position that the 
Union was, in essence, an ongoing contractual arrangement between the states.  Flowing 
logically from this core belief was the conclusion that each state possessed a legal right to 
dissolve the contract if it was breached by other states parties”). 
 93. See STEPHEN NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 10 (2010). 
 94. See MARK GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 177 
(2006) (the “unwillingness to share power ... ‘frustrated’ the constitutional contract, 
providing legal grounds for Southern secession.”). 
 95. See STEPHEN NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL 
WAR 10–11. 
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secession ordinances.96  Moreover, Declarations of secession were 
constructed as but de-ratifications of the compact of 1787, undertaken 
by special state conventions in the same form those that ratified that 
Constitution.97  Secession, on this view, was a remedy for violation of 
the compact.  Aggregation and secession were thought of as mirror 
images of each other. 
The compact theory of the Union prevailed in the antebellum 
South.  No theorist articulated it better than John Calhoun.  Under 
Calhoun’s theory, the Union was an aggregation of sovereign states 
formed by a mutual compact; the central government had no 
independent sources of power, but was solely a creation of the states.  
The states had both the right of nullification (repealing particular laws 
that were inconsistent with the compact) and that of secession (rejecting 
all the laws and institutions of the central government formed by the 
compact). 
Calhoun’s theory was based on a historical narrative of the Union.  
The states, under Calhoun’s narrative, became sovereign upon declaring 
independence from the British Empire.98  The Constitution created “the 
government of a community of States, and not the government of a 
single State or nation.”99  Correspondingly, the territory of the United 
States was that of the individual states, not that of the central 
government.100  No essential difference existed between the Articles of 
 
 96. See South Carolina Declaration of the Causes of Secession, Dec. 24, 1860 (the 
Northern states “have deliberately refused, for years past, to fulfill their constitutional 
obligations”); Georgia Ordinance, Res.  Of Jan. 29, 1861, (ser. 4) OR 81–85, at 84 (the 
Fugitive Slave Act “stands today a dead letter for all practicable purposes in every non-
slave-holding State in the Union”). 
 97. See STEPHEN NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY 13 (2010); Mims v. Wimberly, 33 
Ga. 587 (1863), at 592 (The people in the convention act “in a capacity, higher than, and 
superior to any government, State or Federal, theretofore created, or adopted by them”.);  
ROBERT BURT, CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 203 (1992) (“Forty-two years earlier, in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall had ruled against the compact theory of state sovereignty 
on which the 1861 secessionists relied.  But the seceding states purported to avoid this 
ruling by acting not through their regularly constituted legislatures but through the same 
format of specially convened, popularly elected conventions that had originally ratified the 
Constitution.”). 
 98. See John Calhoun, A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United 
States, in UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN (Ross M. 
Lence ed., 1992). 
 99. Id. 
 100. The first article of Calhoun’s resolutions on the question of slavery in the territories, 
introduced in the Senate on February 19, 1847, read: “Resolved, That the territories of the 
United States belong to the several States composing this Union, and are held by them as 
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Confederation and the Constitution:  The constitution was but “a 
different ‘organization’ of the government, without making any allusion 
whatever to any change in the relations of the States towards each other, 
or the basis of the system.”101  The Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution, accordingly, were both compacts among independent 
sovereigns.102  American history, on this view, was a story of continuous 
secessions:  The thirteen States seceded from the British Empire and 
then entered into the Confederation; unsatisfied with the Confederacy, 
nine States seceded from the Confederation and established a new 
Union by the Constitution.103  “So it had always been, affirmed 
secessionists.  Therefore, so it must always be.”104  The states, thus, 
have the legal right to secede unilaterally from the Union.105  
Before Lincoln took office as president, the North’s constitutional 
arguments against secession were voiced by his predecessor, James 
Buchanan.  The federal government established by the Constitution was 
not “a mere voluntary association of States, to be dissolved at pleasure 
by any one of the contracting parties.”106  Rather, “the Union was 
designed to be perpetual” and the powers of the federal government 
“embrace the very highest attributes of national sovereignty.”107  No 
 
their joint and common property.”  Quoted from HARRY JAFFA, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 404.  Calhoun, however, did not 
consider the territories that had not been incorporated as states. 
 101. JOHN C. CALHOUN, A DISQUISITION ON GOVERNMENT 117 (1851). 
 102. See id., at 116 (“the political relation between these States, under their present 
constitution and government, is substantially the same as under the confederacy and 
revolutionary government; and what that relation was, we are not left to doubt; as they 
declared expressly to be ‘free, independent and sovereign states’”). 
 103. See Judah Benjamin, Farewell Speech to the Senate, Dec. 31, 1860, CONG. GLOBE, 
36th Cong., 2nd Sess. 213 (1860) (“Nine states of the Confederation seceded from the 
Confederation, and formed a new Government. …  After this Government had been 
organized … North Carolina and Rhode Island were still foreign nations, and so treated…”). 
 104. WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS TRIUMPHANT 1854-
1861 347 (2007). 
 105. See CALHOUN, supra note 90, at 116 (Ross Lence ed., 1992) (“The government is a 
federal, in contradistinction to a national government – a government formed by the States; 
ordained and established by the States, and for the States – without any participation or 
agency whatever, on the part of the people, regarded in the aggregate as forming a nation. ... 
In all its parts ... [our system of government] emanated from the same source – the people 
of the several States.  The whole, taken together, from a federal community – a community 
composed of States united by a political compact – and not a nation composed of 
individuals united by, what is called, a social compact.”). 
 106. James Buchanan, Fourth Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union (Dec. 4, 
1860), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29501. 
 107. Id. at 263. 
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state, it follows, has the legal right to unilaterally secede from the 
Union, which is a single nation. 
Buchanan’s view generally followed that of the Federalists.  For the 
Federalists, the Revolution cast off the political authority of the British 
Empire and left the thirteen States free and independent.108  The Articles 
of Confederation united them imperfectly; the Constitution succeeded in 
making the United States a single nation.109  The Marshall Court 
famously expressed a similar opinion in Gibbons v.  Ogden.110 
Lincoln went much further than Buchanan and the Federalists.  His 
legal argument against secession was two-fold.  A legal secession, he 
argued, requires consent of both the seceding state(s) and the whole 
Union.  A state cannot “withdraw from the union, without the consent of 
the Union or of any other State.”111  This argument derived from the idea 
of contract.  All the states should agree to the secession of any state: “one 
party to a contract may violate it – break it, so to speak; but does it not 
require all to lawfully rescind it?”112  The seceding states lacked the 
consent of the United States as a whole.113  Although Lincoln did not 
express what he meant by “consent,” presumably he believed that a 
majority of the whole people or a majority of the states constitute of 
consent.114 
 
 108. See DAVID HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 
259 (2003) (the Philadelphia Convention in 1987 was “an international conference, conducted ... 
among diplomatic plenipotentiaries of the states”). 
 109. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 46 (James Madison), in THE 
FEDERALIST PAPERS (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 110. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US (9 Wheat.) 1, 187(1824) (“Reference has been made 
to the political situation of States, anterior to formation.  It has been said, that they were 
sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a 
league.  This is true.  But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a 
government, when they converted their Congress of Ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on 
their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a Legislature, 
empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the 
States appear, underwent a change.”).   
 111. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, in 4 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS 421, at 433 (Roy. P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter Message to Congress]. 
 112. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, in 4 COLLECTED WORKS, at 262, at 265 
(Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter First Inaugural Address]. 
 113. See Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress, at 437 (“It may well be questioned 
whether there is, to-day, a majority of the legally-qualified voters of any State, except perhaps 
South Carolina, in favor of disunion.  There is much reason to believe that the Union men are 
the majority in many, if not every other one, of the so-called seceded States.”). 
 114. See Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, at 267–68 (“If the minority will not 
acquiesce, the majority must, or the Government must cease.  There is no other alternative, 
for continuing the Government is acquiescence on one side or the other. ... A majority held 
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Responding to the South, Lincoln employed a historical argument 
too – the Union preceded the States:  
 
Our States have neither more nor less power than that 
reserved to them in the Union by the Constitution, no one of them 
ever having been a State out of the Union.  The original ones 
passed into the Union even before they cast off their British 
colonial dependence, and the new ones  . . .  only took the 
designation of States on coming into the Union. . .  The Union, 
and not themselves separately, procured their independence and 
their liberty.  . . .  The Union is older than any of the State, and, in 
fact, it created them as States.115  
 
For Lincoln, the Union made the states, not the other way around.  
The Union began with the Articles of Association in 1774 and then 
“matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776.”116  
Disagreeing with the Court’s view in Gibbons, Lincoln claimed that the 
states never had independent sovereignty: the “states have their status in 
the Union, and they have no other legal status.  If they break from this, 
they can only do so against law, and by revolution.”117  In the 
Declaration, “the ‘united Colonies’ were declared to be ‘Free and 
Independent States’; but, even then, the object plainly was not to declare 
their independence of One Another, or of the Union; but directly contrary, 
as their mutual pledge, and their mutual action, before, at the time, and 
afterwards, abundantly show.”118  The Union was further strengthened by 
the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution.  Secession was 
 
in restraint by constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing easily with 
deliberate changes of popular opinions and sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free 
people.”) Douglass Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Article of 
Confederation and the Constitution, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 337-38 (1997); Akhil Amar, 
Abraham Lincoln and the American Union, U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 1115 (2001).  
 115. Lincoln, Message to Congress, at 433–34. 
 116. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, at 265.  Many scholars agreed with Lincoln’s 
argument.  See e.g., JOEL PARKER, THE RIGHT OF SECESSION: A REVIEW OF THE MESSAGE OF 
JEFFERSON DAVIS TO THE CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES (1861) (It was 
“preposterous to contend that this more perfect Union, established for posterity ... and thus 
substituted for the perpetual, indissoluble union under the Articles, is one which was to exist 
only at the pleasure of each and every State, and to be dissolved when any State shall assert 
that it is aggrieved ...  The Union could not be made ‘more perfect’ in relation to its 
endurance ...  It certainly was not intended to be made less perfect in that particular.”). 
 117. Lincoln, Message to Congress, at 434. 
 118. Id. at 433. 
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unconstitutional under his vision of “a more perfect union” as called forth 
in the Constitution. 
 
B. The Right of Secession as the Right of Revolution 
 
The American civil war of arguments operated on another front as 
well.  In 1860, the South also resorted to the right of revolution to justify 
its secession from the Union.119  Senator Alfred Iverson of Georgia, for 
example, denied the lawfulness of secession but declared that: “each state 
had the right of revolution.  . . .  The secession of a State is an act of 
revolution.”120  “Secession is pretty hard to comprehend,” wrote a young 
Virginian decades later, “[b]ut we all know the meaning of 
Revolution.”121  
To invoke the revolutionary right of secession was to appeal to 
1776.  The Tennessee secession convention, for instance, called their 
secession ordinance a “Declaration of Independence” and claimed 
the “right as free and independent people to alter, reform, or abolish 
our form of Government in such a manner as we think proper.”122  
The Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify 
the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union even used 
the passage in the Declaration, verbatim: “whenever any form of 
government becomes destructive of these ends [natural rights], it is 
the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new 
government.”123  Like the New England Federalists in the 1810s, the 
South thought they were following the revolutionary tradition of 
America in responding to a Union that had degenerated into an 
 
 119. See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS TRIUMPHANT 
1854-1861 346-47 (2007) (“Disunionists needed ... an inspiring justification of a right to 
secede, one that aroused cheers even among anti-secessionists.  In the tradition of 1776 – in 
the (white) people of any single state’s natural right to withdraw consent to be governed –
disunionists found their stirring state’s rights dogma.”); JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY 
FOR FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 240 (2003) (“Those southerners (mostly conditional 
unionists) who found [the theory of lawful secession] a bit hard to swallow could fall back 
on the right of revolution.”). 
 120. CG, 36 Cong., 10–11, quoted from JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY FOR 
FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 240 (2003). 
 121. FREEHLING, supra note 120, at 346. 
 122. THE REBELLION RECORD: A DIARY OF AMERICAN EVENTS I: 203 (Frank Moore ed., 
1861). 
 123. The Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession 
of South Carolina from the Federal Union, available at https://www.civilwar.org/learn/ 
primary-sources/declaration-causes-seceding-states#South_Carolina. 
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oppressive government led by the North.  Both the North and the 
South recognized this revolutionary principle.124  As Robert Cover 
put it, “[s]ecession is the revolutionary response to an order founded 
on consent or social contract.”125 
The difference between the constitutional right of secession and 
the revolutionary right of secession is important.  “A revolutionary 
justification . . . is concerned with unlawful action by subjects against 
a sovereign.  . . .  Revolutionary action . . . always involves a 
violation of the law in force at the time at which the revolt takes 
place.  It becomes lawful only in retrospect . . .  Legality follows in 
the footsteps of power.  But power comes first, and legality 
second.”126  Furthermore, even if the North did not break the 
constitutional compact, the South still had a political right to secede 
on the revolutionary basis.127 
To be sure, Lincoln did not deny the right of revolution.128  The 
right of revolution, however, was a limited right in Lincoln’s eyes.  
“The right of revolution, is never a legal right.  The very term implies 
the breaking, and not the abiding by, organic law.  At most, it is but a 
moral right, when exercised for a morally justifiable cause.  When 
exercised without such a cause revolution is no right, but simply a 
wicked exercise of physical power.”129  Clearly, for Lincoln, 
revolution is a right outside of law and constitutionality.  As such, it 
depends upon a prior violation of a compelling moral norm.130  The 
 
 124. See JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY FOR FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 247 
(2003) (“Neither Lincoln nor any other northerner denied the right of revolution.  After all, 
Yankees shared the legacy of 1776.”). 
 125. Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, at 23–24 (1983). 
 126. STEPHEN NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 8 
(2010). 
 127. See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, ROAD TO DISUNION 1854-61 346 (Quoting Judah 
Benjamin: “The rights of the states under the Constitution” resulted “from the nature of their 
bargain.”  If “sister states” break “the bargain,” the “breach of compact” invites injured 
states to “consider themselves freed” from the original contract.  Yet even “if the bargain be 
not broken,” if “wrong and oppression shall become sufficiently aggravated, the 
revolutionary right – the last inherent right of man to preserve freedom, property, and safety 
... must be exercised.”). 
 128. See Thomas J. Pressly, Bullets and Ballots: Lincoln and the “Right of Revolution”, 
67 AME. HIST. REV. 3, 647–62 (1962). 
 129. Supra note 84, at 434. 
 130. Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, at 267, 269 (“If, by the mere force of numbers, a 
majority should deprive a minority of any clearly written constitutional right, it might, in a 
moral point of view, justify revolution – certainly would, if such right were a vital one. …  
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South, Lincoln thought, lacked such a just cause because their 
fundamental constitutional and moral rights had not been infringed 
upon.   
For Lincoln, secession without a just cause attacks constitutional 
democracy.  Without a just cause, revolutionary actions are but the 
revolt of the minority.  Apart from a moral claim, revolution is just a 
declaration of war.  Secession, as a minority revolt,  
 
Presents to the whole family of man, the question, 
whether a constitutional republic, or a democracy . . . can, or 
cannot, maintain its territorial integrity, against its own 
domestic foes.  It presents the question, whether discontented 
individuals, too few in numbers to control administration, . . . 
[can] break up their Government, and thus practically put an 
end to free government upon the earth.131   
 
Lincoln was speaking of “the right of opposing unjustified 
revolution.”132  The majority in this democratic government must 
prove “that those who can fairly carry an election, can also suppress 
a rebellion – that ballots are the rightful, and peaceful, successors of 
bullets; and that when ballots have fairly and constitutionally, 
decided, there can be no successful appeal, except to ballots 
themselves, at succeeding elections.”133  
What Lincoln did was at least equally important as what he said.  
To protect the constitutional government, Lincoln even acted beyond 
legality and constitutionality: He suspended habeas corpus and took 
on the power of declaring war.134  Lincoln’s desperate efforts to save 
the union make a final point in response to the right of revolution.  
To vindicate the right of secession as a right of revolution, the 
seceding states had to gain victory on the battlefield.  To fully imitate 
the revolutionaries of 1776, secessionists of 1861 must win.  Robert 
Cover observed that in the Jewish legal tradition: “To be an 
 
This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it.  Whenever they shall 
grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of 
amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember, or overthrow it.”). 
 131. Lincoln, Message to Congress, at 426. 
 132. See Thomas J. Pressly, Bullets and Ballots: Lincoln and the “Right of Revolution”, 
67 AME. HIST. REV. 3, 660 (1962). 
 133. Lincoln, Message to Congress, at 439. 
 134. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 20 (K. Attell trans., 2005). 
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inhabitant of the biblical normative world is to understand, first, that 
the rule of succession can be overturned; second, that it takes a 
conviction of divine destiny to overturn it; and third, that divine 
destiny is likely to manifest itself precisely in overturning this 
specific rule.”135  The rationale of the right of revolution in American 
constitutional order was similar.  As the Supreme Court held in 
Williams v. Bruffy (1877), the validity of secession as a right of 
revolution depends on its success.136  To invoke the revolutionary 
right of secession was to prepare for war.  And the result of the 
war decided whether the act of the South was a revolution or a 
revolt.   
Turning to the right of revolution, the disagreement between 
the North and the South proceeded from interpretation of the 
Constitution to invocation of the Declaration of Independence.137  
Lincoln focused on the “self-evident” truth of equality; he put 
natural right before the claims to independent statehood.138 
Disunionists, in contrast, highlighted the self-government of the 
people and interpreted that inalienable right as leading to 
independence.  What deserves special attention here is Lincoln’s 
interpretation of the Declaration as not merely a statement, but as 
a moment of sacrificial action.  As the founding document of the 
United States, the Declaration was not written in ink, but in blood; 
it involved struggle and sacrifice.139  The Declaration ends with a 
mutual pledge of “our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.” 
Lincoln himself was even prepared to sacrifice: “I was about to 
 
 135. Cover, supra note 117, at 22. 
 136. See Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 186 (1877) (“The validity of its acts 
[separation], both against the parent State and its citizens or subjects, depends entirely upon 
its ultimate success.  If it fails to establish itself permanently, all such acts perish with it.  If 
it succeed, and become recognized, its acts from the commencement of its existence are 
upheld as those of an independent nation.”). 
 137. See David Armitage, Contagion of Sovereignty, 52 SOUTH AFRICAN HIST. J., 14 
(2005) (“The American Civil War can be seen, among many other things, as a battle over 
the structural interpretation of the Declaration of Independence.”). 
 138. See MERRILL D. PETERSON, ‘THIS GRAND PERTINACITY’: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND 
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1991). 
 139. Abraham Lincoln, Speech in Independence Hall (Feb. 22 1861), in 4 COLLECTED 
WORKS, at 240, 240 (“I have never had a feeling politically that did not spring from the 
sentiments embodied in the Declaration of Independence.  I have often pondered over the 
dangers which were incurred by the men who assembled here and adopted that Declaration 
of Independence – I have pondered over the toils that were endured by the officers and 
soldiers of the army, who achieved that Independence.). 
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say I would rather be assassinated on this spot than to surrender 
it.”140  
To dissolve that union united on revolutionary sacrifice, 
disunionists could not merely speak as the revolutionaries of 1776.  
They had to act like them.  The right to revolution takes the form 
of fighting, not simply of arguing.  The Union’s sovereignty had 
been tested by the sacrificial action against external enemies at the 
time of the Declaration; it had to be retested by a subsequent 
sacrificial action against internal enemies.  Both the Union and the 
Confederacy claimed to be the heirs of the American 
revolutionaries.  The Civil War was to determine the true heir.  
The Union won.141  The claim to a revolutionary right of secession 
became invalid at Appomattox. 
 
C. Nationalism, Self-Determination, and Nation-Building  
 
The American Civil War happened at a moment in world history 
characterized by the rise of nationalism.  As a political conception, 
nationalism generally holds that the political and the national units 
should be congruent.142  Nationalism is usually distinguished as 
being civic and ethnic.143  Civic nationalism means a belief in 
common citizenship of a state with defined territory and common 
allegiance to the law and institutions of that state.144  Historically, it 
generally came from Western Europe, and was especially brought 
forth by the French Revolution.  The idea of the people, which was 
put forth to challenge the old regime, was easily translated to the 
image of the nation in post-Revolutionary France.  Taking the place 
of the king, nationality became the sacred. 
Ethnic nationalism, on the other hand, tends to put at the center 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. See FRANK L. OWSLEY, STATE RIGHTS AND THE CONFEDERACY (1925) (arguing that 
the Confederacy “died of states’ rights”: strong-willed governors and state legislatures in the 
South refused to give the Confederacy the soldiers and money it needed because they feared 
that the Confederacy was encroaching on the rights of the states). 
 142. See ERNST GALLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 1 (1983). 
 143. See, e.g., Anthony Smith, Civic and Ethnic Nationalism, in NATIONS AND 
NATIONALISM: A READER 177–83 (Philip Spence & Howard Vollman eds., 2005). 
 144. See MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, BLOOD AND BELONGING: JOURNEYS INTO THE NEW 
NATIONALISM 7 (1993) (“According to the civic nationalist creed, what holds a society 
together is not common roots but law.”). 
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of national identity a myth of common biological origins, language, 
and folklore.145  Historically, ethnic nationalism began with 
ethnography in the second half of the nineteenth century; it built 
nations, rather than the other way around.146  Ethnic nationalism 
was greatly reinforced by the development of romantic political 
theory put forth by figures like German philosophers Herder and 
Fichte.  For them, pre-political, authentic, communal identity – 
based on ethnicity and language – defines a nation that exists 
before, beyond, and beneath the state.147  In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, as the historian Eric Hobsbawm observed,  
 
Ethnic nationalism received enormous reinforcement, 
in practice from increasingly massive geographical 
migrations of peoples, and in theory by the transformation 
of that central concept of nineteenth-century social science, 
‘race’.  On the one hand the old-established division of 
mankind into a few ‘races’ distinguished by skin [color] 
was now elaborated into a set of ‘racial’ distinctions 
separating peoples of approximately the same pale skin. . .  
On the other hand Darwinian evolutionism, supplemented 
later by what came to be known as genetics, provided 
racism with what looked like a powerful set of ‘scientific’ 
reasons for keeping out or even . . . expelling and 
murdering strangers.148 
 
 
 145. See AVIEL ROSHWALD, ETHNIC NATIONALISM AND THE FALL OF EMPIRES 5 (2001) 
(“Modern ethnic nationalism originated among intellectual elites in nineteenth-century 
Central and Eastern Europe, who were alienated from imperial states that lagged behind the 
West European pace of political and economic modernization, and that could not or would 
not accommodate new elites’ aspiration to political empowerment.  In the multiethnic 
empires, populations were culturally and linguistically so diverse that any assertion of the 
modern notion of popular (as opposed to dynastic) sovereignty was likely to unleash 
centrifugal rather than integrative forces.”). 
 146. See ERNST GELLNER, CONDITIONS OF LIBERTY 116 (1994) (“Nationalism began with 
ethnography, half descriptive half normative, a kind of salvage operation and cultural 
engineering combined.  If the eventual units were to be compact and reasonably 
homogeneous, more had to be done: many, many people had to be assimilated, or expelled 
or killed.  All these methods were eventually employed in the course of implementing the 
nationalist political principle, and they continued to be in use.”). 
 147. See JOHANN G. FICHTE, ADDRESSES TO THE GERMAN NATION (R. F. Jones & G. H. 
Turnbell trans., 1979); VICKI A. SPENCER, HERDER’S POLITICAL THOUGHT (2012). 
 148. ERIC HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 108 (1990). 
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Civic or ethnic, modern nationalism is political in nature.149  
Nineteenth-century nationalism could be either centrifugal or 
centripetal; it could take the form of either aggregation or 
disaggregation.  Often, civic nationalism promoted unifications 
while ethnic nationalism fueled separations.  Examples of 
separation nationalism were Greece (from the Ottoman Empire), 
Ireland (from the British Empire), and Hungary (from the 
Habsburg Empire) in the first half of the nineteenth century.  In 
the later nineteenth century, nationalism generally shifted from an 
emancipatory, centrifugal force to a centralizing, nation-building 
force, from separatist nationalism to unification nationalism.150  
The world witnessed the unification movements of German and 
Italy, among others, during that period.   
The Confederacy once thought history was on their side.  In the 
eyes of its supporters, the Confederacy was joining the world-historical 
tide of ethno-national independence movements based on the principle 
of national self-determination.  Southern leaders and theorists thought of 
themselves as a distinctive ethnicity, characterized by a separate culture 
of racial purity and white supremacy – a culture hugely different from 
that of the “Yankees.”151  Some Confederate supporters compared their 
secessionist actions to the independence movements of the Greeks 
and the Hungarians.152  Reciprocally, some statesmen in Europe 
found the South admirable because it advocated the principle of 
national self-determination.  William Gladstone, for example, 
once said that Jefferson Davis had made a nation.153  Responding 
to this claim of self-determination, the Union found itself actually 
 
 149. See JOHN BREUILLY, NATIONALISM AND THE STATE (1982). 
 150. See Armitage et al., supra note 62, at 465 (on the former, the U.S. South, the Qing 
Empire; the latter, the unification of Germany and Italy etc.). 
 151. See Paul Quigley, Secessionists in an Age of Secession: The Slave South in 
Transatlantic Perspective, in SECESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENON 163-164 (Don 
H. Doyle ed., 2010); Benning speech, in SECESSION DEBATED: GEORGIA’S SHOWDOWN IN 
1860 119–20 (W. Freehling and C. Simpson eds., 1992); James M. McPherson, Was Blood 
Thicker than Water? Ethnic and Civic Nationalism in the American Civil War, 143 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY SOCIETY 1, 105–06 (Mar. 1999) (The 
Southerners thought that “Southen whites, … were descended from the Norman conquerors 
by way of the English Cavaliers of the seventeenth century, while Yankees were descended 
from the conquered Anglo-Saxons by way of the seventeenth-century Puritans who 
migrated to New England when the Cavaliers migrated to Virginia.”).    
 152. See, e.g., T. W. MACMAHON, CAUSE AND CONTRACT 153 (1862); BERNARD J. SAGE, 
DAVIS AND LEE 10–11 (1866). 
 153. See Armitage et al., supra note 62, at 467 (Thomas Bender). 
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relying on the old right of the sovereign to put down rebellions 
within its territory.  In this, it followed the practice of European 
empires.154 
The Confederacy’s national self-determination justification, 
however, was troubled by two facts.  First, although Southerners 
emphasized the Cavalier/Yankee distinction, they were not a separate 
ethnic group within the United States.  Southerners spoke the same 
language as Northerners.  They had joined the founding and sustaining 
project of the United States.  For a long time, they even played a leading 
role in that project.  It was, accordingly, difficult for European countries 
to recognize Southerners as a genuine nation on ethnic basis.  They 
were not like the Irish people in the British Empire. 
Second, and more importantly, the South’s claim of national 
self-determination was greatly discredited by slavery and the 
slavocratic regime.  Nineteenth-century nationalism was 
emphatically liberal.  Consider the words of the famous Italian 
nationalist theorist Mazzini:  
 
Inasmuch as we believe in Liberty, Equality, 
Fraternity, and Association, for the individuals composing 
the State, we believe also in Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, 
and Association of Nations.  Peoples are the individuals of 
Humanity.  Nationality is the sign of their individuality and 
the guarantee of their liberty. . .”155  In part, this liberalism 
reflected the fact that the rising middle class used the 
weapon of nationalism against oppression of transnational 
monarchs and aristocrats.156 
 
  European nationalist sympathy was affected not by the 
Southern disunionists but by the Northern abolitionists.157  The 
Southern secessionists might have been nationalistic, yet they 
were not liberal in the sense of nineteenth-century liberalisms that 
fought against inequality.   
 
 154. See id., at 472 (2011) (Don Doyle). 
 155. GIUSEPPE MAZZINI, A Basis of Central European Organization, in SELECTED 
WRITINGS 149 (Nagendranath Gangulee ed., 2006). 
 156. Otto Pflanze, Nationalism in Europe, 1848-1871, 28 REV. POL. 129, 142 (1966). 
 157. See W. Caleb McDaniel, Repealing Unions: American Abolitionists, Irish Repeal, 
and the Origins of Garrisonian Disunionism, 28 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 2, 244 (2008). 
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From the Union’s point of view, the American Civil War was 
a matter of forging and sustaining civic nationalism.158  Surely, it 
protected the territorial unity of the United States.  It represented 
the triumph of a unification trend over separatist movements.159  
More than that, the North’s victory helped build a more united 
nation.  It consolidated the independence of the United States against 
foreign powers like Britain, and it laid the groundwork for the 
imperial expansion of the United States in the years to come.160  The 
North seemed to follow the juggernaut of national unification in 
world history.  Bismarck, for example, supported the Union because 
secession was not credible in the process of nation-state building.161  
If modern nationalism would come to place nations before 
states, America was a state before nations or a state-nation.162  
 
 158. See THOMAS BENDER, A NATION AMONG NATIONS: AMERICA’S PLACE IN WORLD 
HISTORY (2006) (arguing that the effort of the Union fits into the trajectory of nation-state 
building in the nineteenth century: a centralized state based on individual freedom and 
national ideology); Armitage et al., supra note 62, at 473 (Leslie Butler) (arguing that war 
birthed nationalism, not the other way around: “the events of the state-making war helped 
consolidated nationalism in cultural terms as well…  The startling casualties on both sides 
made the war a crucible in which a shared sense of national suffering and purpose was 
forged.”); Grant, supra note 86, at 133 (Don Doyle ed., 2010) (“The American Civil War 
was a war of state formation...”). 
 159. See Paul Quigley, Secessionists in an Age of Secession: The Slave South in 
Transatlantic Perspective, in SECESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENON 151–73 (Don 
H. Doyle ed., 2010); Frank Towers, The Origins of the Antimodern South: Romantic 
Nationalism and the Secession Movement in the American South, Id. at 174–90.; On 
separatist nationalism in Europe, see TIMOTHY BAYCROFT AND MARK HEWITSON, eds., 
WHAT IS A NATION? EUROPE 1789–1914 (2006). 
 160. See Armitage et al., supra note 62, at 479–80 (Jay Sexton) (The Civil War was 
“pivotal not only to the rising American imperialism of the nineteenth century but also to its 
anti-imperial consolidation.  Both sides of the Civil War saw themselves as carrying on the 
torch of 1776 and, revealingly, came to view the other in relation to the persistent British 
threat. …  [T]he Civil War was a culmination of sorts of the Revolution. ...  [T]he North’s 
triumph both consolidated the independence of the new nation and sowed the seeds of the 
American empire that emerged in the coming decades.  The result of 1865 cemented the 
bonds of union between the states, thus foreclosing the possible reintroduction of European 
balance-of-power politics into the American union. ...  [T]he Civil War was a final phase of 
America’s liberation from the British Empire, as well as a central event in the emergence of 
its own empire.”).    
 161. See Dieter Langewiesche, The Nation as a Developing Resource Community: A 
Generalizing Comparison, in COMPARATIVE AND TRANSNATIONAL HISTORY 133–48 (Haupt 
and Kocka eds.).   
 162. See Armitage et al., supra note 62, at 478 (David Armitage) (“It’s vital to have been 
reminded that what we mean by nationalism is the desire of nations (however defined) to 
possess states to create the peculiar hybrid we call the nation-state, and likewise, to recall 
that there’s also a beast we might call the state-nation, which arises when the state is formed 
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Neither the North nor the South was a nation-state in the classic 
nationalist sense, let alone the United States as a whole.  After 
all, the United States was a federal union, the nature of which 
was still subject to hot debate.  Emphatically, it was the Civil 
War that produced American nationalist imaginations, rather than 
the other way around.  Although, before the Civil War, both the 
North and the South asserted distinct economic modes 
(industrialization/agriculture), culture (popular/chivalric), and even 
ways of life, it was the War that transformed both into a single 
political project of American nationalism.   
For the North, the unification-nationalist vision was born of 
and consolidated by military mobilization to defend the Union.  
Considering the federal structure of the Union and the localism 
that flowed from it, sustaining the war effort to preserve the Union 
was quite remarkable.  The Union had to be worthy of fighting 
and sacrifice.163  Many Northern intellectuals regarded the 
secession crisis as an opportunity for strengthening American 
nationalism, for it aroused a patriotic sense of the unity of 
America as an indivisible nation.164  After the Revolution, 
according to one account, Americans “sank rapidly into a 
condition of utter impotence, imbecility, anarchy.  [They] had 
achieved our independence, but [they] had not constructed a 
nation.”165 Nationalistic sentiments, aroused by the war, 
characterized a redefinition of the American polity and political 
culture.166  “[S]ecession was opposed in America not only by the 
 
before the development of any sense of national consciousness.  The United States might be 
seen as a, perhaps the only, spectacular example of the latter.”). 
 163. See Grant, supra note 86, at 133 (“The Civil War was ... a ‘people’s contest’, as 
Abraham Lincoln famously called it, but for the Union this meant persuading the people to 
keep fighting; it meant convincing them that the nation as a single nation was worth the 
sacrifice and that secession was, as Lincoln saw it, not a constitutional right but ‘the essence 
of anarchy.’”). 
 164. See James Russell Lowell, E Pluribus Unum, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Feb. 1861, 235, 
236, 238, 237 (“Rebellion smells no sweeter because it is called secession,” for it gave rise 
to “a sense of national unity, and make them [Americans] feel that patriotism was anything 
more than a pleasing sentiment, ... a feeble reminiscence, rather than a living fact with a 
direct bearing on the national well-being”; America “is a unitary and indivisible nation, with 
a national life to protect, a national power to maintain, and national rights to defend... Our 
national existence is all that gives value to American citizenship” that should not be 
dismissed “by a mere quibble of Constitutional interpretation.”). 
 165. JOHN L. MOTLEY, THE CAUSES OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR: A LETTER TO THE 
LONDON TIMES 7 (1861). 
 166. See Grant, supra note 86, at 137 (“[T]he North’s version of the nation moved 
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executive, nor just by constitutional theorists, but by the mass 
volunteer armies of the Union, who were supported in their 
sentiments by their home communities.”167  The War enhanced 
local traditions of violent vigilantism to defend law, self-governing 
institutions, and order, moving those efforts to the national level.168  
Central to the Northern nationalism, which later became American 
nationalism, was a version of American exceptionalism.  Abraham 
Lincoln took the political project of America as the last best hope of 
mankind in his Gettysburg Address when he said that “the government 
of the people, by the people, for the people, shall never perish from the 
earth.”  The Civil War both reflected and facilitated the political 
theology of America.169  The theologian Horace Bushnell made this 
point in his Yale alumni address shortly after the Civil War: “The 
sacrifice in the fields of the Revolution united us but imperfectly.  We 
had not bled enough to merge our colonial distinctions . . .  and make us 
a proper nation.  And so, what argument could not accomplish, sacrifice 
has achieved . . .  now a new and stupendous chapter of national 
history” came; blood shedding has “cemented and sanctified” national 
unity.170  James Russell Lovell, too, said that the “man who ever 
doubted that the first gun fired by the insurgents would instantly unite 
the nation against them knew as little of the American people as if he 
were editor of the London Times.  There is no chemical solvent like 
gunpowder.”171  For the author and educator Julian M. Sturtevant, 
A government of limited powers can exert those powers in 
presence of and in opposition to those states from which it 
originally received them by voluntary cession, till it has been 
 
beyond the notion that the Constitution was the binding document of the Union and beyond 
the them of law and order to construct a more robust version of nationalism that established 
the grounds for what Lincoln would famously describe at Gettysburg as ‘a new birth of 
freedom’ for the nation.”); GEORGE FLETCHER, THE SECRET CONSTITUTION. 
 167. Id. at 141. 
 168. See Philip S. Paludan, The American Civil War Considered as a Crisis in Law and 
Order, 77 AMERICAN HIST. REV. 4, 1013–1034 (1972). 
 169. On the concept of the political theology of America, see PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL 
THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (2011). 
 170. HORACE BUSHNELL, Our Obligations to the Dead (1865), in LIFE AND LETTERS OF 
HORACE BUSHNELL 485–86 (Mary Bushnell Cheney ed., 1905); see also Susan-Mary Grant, 
“How a Free People Conduct a Long War”: Sustaining Opposition to Secession in the 
American Civil War, in SECESSION AS AN INTERNATIONAL PHENOMENON 145 (Don Doyle 
ed., 2010) (“[T]he sacrifice, the suffering, and  the loss of life were both necessary and 
divinely ordained” and “war was a test of American faith, a path to American nationality.”). 
 171. James Russell Lowell, The Ordeal by Battle, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1861, 89. 
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proved by fierce and bloody conflict.  Till our general 
government has asserted those powers in the face of opposition, 
and shown its strength by overcoming resistance and trampling 
out rebellion, it will  . . . almost necessarily be regarded as weak 
and helpless, dependent on the capricious will of thirty-four 
sovereign states. . .172 
This American exceptionalism based on republican political 
institutions can be better appreciated if put into an international 
context.  English aristocrats joyfully regarded the Secession Crisis as 
the failure of the American, republican, political experiment.  Lord 
Ramsden, for example, said that the “great republican bubble has 
burst.”  Many thought America would return to monarchy.173  
Lincoln’s fear that republican government was in danger of perishing 
from the earth was correct if seen in this a larger perspective.174  
Consider that in the nineteenth century, republican regimes or 
experiments faced a low tide: Latin America’s caudillos began to 
rise; France invaded republican Mexico; Spain reannexed Saint 
Domingo; and even the American South had a tincture of 
aristocracy.175  
The South also thought it was pursuing a sacred course.  Apart 
from their problematic litany of a right of national self-determination, 
they believed they were following the sacred tradition of the American 
Revolution.  A Confederate army officer, for example, said: “I took up 
the arms, sir, upon a broader ground – the right of revolution.  We were 
wronged.  Our properties and liberties were about to be taken from us.  
It was a sacred duty to rebel.”176  Jefferson Davis, too, declared that: 
“the high and solemn motive of defending the rights . . .  which our 
fathers bequeathed to us” drove the South to “renew such sacrifices as 
our fathers made to the holy cause of constitutional liberty.”177  It was in 
their real revolutionary actions, not only in their discourse about the 
revolutionary tradition, that Southerners transformed the dialectic of 
 
 172. JULIAN STURTEVANT, THE LESSONS OF OUR NATIONAL CONFLICT 16 (1861). 
 173. See Armitage et al., supra note 62, at 463 (Don Doyle). 
 174. See Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address (“…the government of the people, 
by the people, for the people shall never perish from the earth.”), available at http:// 
avalon.law.yale. edu/nineteenth_century/gettyb.asp. 
 175. See Armitage et al., supra note 62, at 480. 
 176. GEORGE W. NICHOLS, THE STORY OF THE GREAT MARCH 302 (1865) (emphasis 
added). 
 177. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 241 (2003). 
3. Liu ‐ Three Arguments of Secession (1).docx  11/27/2017  11:13 AM 
92 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 41:1 
constitutionalism and revolution into a nationalistic imagination.  “The 
Civil War did far more to produce southern nationalism . . . than 
southern nationalism did to produce the war.”178  
Both the North and the South thought they were engaging in a 
sacred project that deserved sacrifice.  In this way, the American Civil 
War actually resembled a war of civil religions, even a religious war, 
within the same political community—one sharing a common 
historical tradition.  It was a contest to define the national political 
identity of America.  Both sides regarded their marches as 
crusades.179  Both spared no effort in advancing the holy mission of 
the American political experiment.180  Both believed that God was 
not neutral between them.  Both submitted the dispute to the court of 
God (the battlefield) rather than the court of humans (e.g., the 
Supreme Court of the United States).  The whole process and its end 
make better sense in the language of medieval law, which appeals to 
trial by battle and conquest.181  
 
III. The Failure of Arguments: The “Trial of Battle” and  
the Idea of Conquest 
 
Interestingly, under a union governed by the law, neither side 
turned to the Supreme Court to resolve the crucial political debate 
over secession.  This was so even though many notable 
contemporaries thought the war was both unnecessary and 
undesirable.182  In 1859, the Taney Court, speaking of its final 
power of constitutional review, claimed itself to be a “calm and 
deliberate arbiter” to avoid “force and violence” and “revolutions 
by force of arms.”183  Yet in 1861, “revolutionary ‘force and 
 
 178. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS, 1848-1861 469 (1976). 
 179. See MCPHERSON, supra note 178, at 241–42. 
 180. See DREW G. FAUST, THIS REPUBLIC OF SUFFERING: DEATH AND THE AMERICAN 
CIVIL WAR (2008). 
 181. See Cynthia Nicoletti, The American Civil War as a Trial by Battle, 28 L. HIST. 
REV. 1, 71–110 (2010). 
 182. Chief Justice Taney, for example, hoped that both sides would come to see that “a 
peaceful separation, with free institutions in each section, is far better than the union of all 
the present states under a military government, and a reign of terror preceded too by a civil 
war with all its horrors.”  See Roger Taney, Letter of June 12, 1861, quoted from C. G. 
HAINES & F. H. SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
AND POLITICS 465 (1957). 
 183. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 520–21 (1859) (“And as the final appellate 
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violence’ between federal and state governments did erupt in the 
Civil War.  . . .  And in this ultimate conflict, neither the federal 
government nor the seceding states appealed to the ‘calm and 
deliberate’ arbitration proffered for such disputes by the Supreme 
Court.”184  Lincoln denied a role to the Court in resolving the 
conflict over slavery; neither would he refer the question of 
secession to the Court.185  Rather, he himself interpreted the 
Constitution, arguing against the legality of secession.  His 
constitutional interpretation became that for which Northerners 
fought during the War.186  The South did not turn to the Court 
either, since such an appeal would implicitly recognize the 
authority of the Federal government from which they wanted to 
separate, even were the South to win the case.187  According to 
Robert Burt, “in this central constitutional crisis, none of the 
adversaries sought judicial review, and the Supreme Court stood at 
the sidelines of the conflicts.”188  Only after the Civil War did the 
Supreme Court take up the issue of secession and affirm the 
indivisibility of the Union.189  Instead, both sides turned to war 
and physical force.190  The final “judgment” over the legitimacy of 
 
power in all such questions is given to this court, controversies as to the respective powers 
of the United States and the States, instead of being determined by military and physical 
force, are heard, investigated, and finally settled with the calmness and deliberation of 
judicial inquiry.  And no one can fail to see that, if such an arbiter had not been provided in 
our complicated system of government, internal tranquility could not have been preserved, 
and if such controversies were left to arbitrament of physical force, our Government, State 
and National, would soon cease to be Governments of laws, and revolutions by force of 
arms would take the place of courts of justice and judicial decisions.”).   
 184. ROBERT BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 202 (1992). 
 185. See, Id. at 204 (1992) (“[F]rom Lincoln’s perspective, there were enormous 
risks in entrusting his cherished ideal of perpetual union to a Supreme Court dominated 
by proslavery Southerners, notwithstanding the apparently favorable auguries of the 
Court’s recent jurisprudence.”). 
 186. ROBERT BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 202–03 (1992). 
 187. See FARBER, supra note 2, at 22 (2003) (“The South’s constitutional theory was 
that ultimate authority over constitutional issues did not reside in the Supreme Court or 
in the process for constitutional amendments, but in the sovereign people in each 
state.”). 
 188. BURT, supra note 175, at 204 (1992). 
 189. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, at 724-25 (1869) (“Union of the States never 
was a purely artificial and arbitrary relation. It began among the Colonies, and grew out 
of common origins, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and 
geographical relations.”). 
 190. See Cynthia Nicoletti, supra note 172, at 76 (2010) (“Rather than turning to the 
legal process to determine the legitimacy of the ultimate expression of state sovereignty 
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secession was made at the Appomattox Courthouse rather than in 
the Washington D.C. courthouse.191  The robust discussion of the 
right of secession before the Civil War vanished from public 
dialogue with the victory of the Union Army.   
Reflecting on the Civil War, many fell back on the metaphor 
of trial by battle and the idea of conquest to make sense of this 
bloody conflict and its result.192  For ex-Confederates, the 
metaphor was to console.  For Unionists, it was to vindicate.  Both 
recognized that the deliberation of the rule of law, in which they 
had taken pride, gave way to the premodern idea of conquest, 
which they had tended to cast aside.  As Nicoletti writes,  
Although Civil War-era Americans prided themselves on their 
commitment to reasoned argument as the only acceptable method 
of settling legal disputes, they recognized that their civil war 
deviated monstrously from this ideal.  The experience of armed 
conflict on such a massive scale forced Americans to confront the 
harsh realization that they had resorted to the irrationality of 
violence in order to settle the most contentious legal issue of their 
time.193 
Even Supreme Court justices invoked the ideas of trial by 
battle and conquest in cases related to the constitutionality of 
secession.  In an 1863 decision, the Supreme Court validated 
President Lincoln’s blockade of Confederate ports.194  Justice 
Robert Grier, who wrote the majority opinion, likened the Civil 
War to a trial by battle:  The Seceded States “combined to form a 
new confederacy, claiming to be acknowledged by the world as a 
sovereign state.  Their right to do so is now being decided by 
wager of battle.”195  The constitutionality of secession, in his 
opinion, could not be decided by the court of law, but only by the 
result of war.   
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Six years later, the Court addressed the constitutionality of 
secession again in Texas v. White.196  In that case, the Reconstruction 
government of Texas claimed that United States bonds owned by 
Texas since 1850 had been illegally sold by the Confederate state 
legislature during the Civil War.  It filed suit directly with the 
Supreme Court, invoking the original jurisdiction of the Court.  The 
Court held that Texas had remained in the Union during the War in 
spite of its secession.  In wake of the Union victory, Chief Justice 
Salmon Chase, writing for the majority, pronounced the 
unconstitutionality of secession from its first exercise by the 
Southern states, speaking of “an indestructible Union, composed of 
indestructible states” created by the Constitution.197  Justice Grier 
dissented.  Texas, he argued, was not within the United States during 
the War, and therefore could not file suit in the Court.  Rather, Texas 
was a “conquered province by military force,” as treated by 
Congress.198  His point was that secession was not illegal from the 
beginning of the secessionist movement.  The triumph of the Union 
army denied the right of secession.  During the War, Texas had 
seceded.  After the War, it was conquered.   
The idea of conquest, surprisingly or not, emerged in Grier’s 
pondering over the Civil War.  Some statesmen and theorists, 
taking up that idea, articulated a conquest theory of reunion.  For 
example, Thaddeus Stevens, a Radical Republican, hoped to 
realize racial equality in the South through the exercise of 
virtually limitless federal power, justified by the conquest of 
Southern states.199  The title of conquest, which was formerly 
invoked by Americans in acquiring the lands of the Indian 
barbarians, now applied to the retaking of the territories of their 
fellow Christians. 
Although the language of rights proliferated in multiple forms 
in the debates over the legitimacy of secession, all failed to lead to 
a peaceful resolution.  A constitutional right of secession was put 
forth.  Yet it met a counterargument of the illegality of secession 
in the American constitutional system.  Constitutional arguments 
could persuade neither side.  As the Supreme Court was set aside, 
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there was no judge to decide on the dispute, let alone to enforce 
that decision.  The South also resorted to the right of revolution.  
Yet that right depends on factual success, not just reasoned 
arguments or political polemics.  The Union disapproved the 
Southern claim of revolutionary right by defeating the Southern 
army.  A nationalistic justification of secession on an ethnic basis 
– the equivalent of the twentieth-century right of national self-
determination – was also invoked.  But it was marred by an 
insufficient ethnic distinction and the illiberal nature of slavocracy.  
More importantly, the Southern ethnic, separationist nationalism 
encountered the Union’s civic, unificationist nationalism.   
Looking back, the American Civil War was both a typical and an 
atypical case of the modern politics of secession as it took form in the 
twentieth century.  As a typical case, it shows that the disunion of states 
operates in a domain beyond legality in an age of popular sovereignty.  
War and sacrifice, rather than legal arguments and judicial opinions, 
define secessionist movements and anti-secession acts in democracies.  
The American case was atypical, however, because national self-
determination played a minor role.  The problem of secession in the 
American Civil War was largely a problem of democratic self-
government in a post-revolutionary state.  The Civil War remained 
rooted in the revolutionary republicanism of the eighteenth century, 
even as it pointed toward the coming violence of the twentieth century. 
During the Civil War, the Southern secessionists resorted to both 
legal and extralegal arguments to justify secession.  Despite these 
normative arguments, Americans fought desperately to settle the issue.  
Normative thinking gave way to existential fighting.200  This strange 
way of settling normative debate made sense under the old-fashioned 
right of conquest.  Yet the right of conquest among civilized peoples 
was denied by the idea of consent.  Secession and reunion, then, have to 
be seen as operating extralegally.  The exceptional act of secession was 
met by Lincoln’s exceptional acts in defense of the Union. 
Secession cannot be juridicalized because it touches upon 
constituent power, not just constituted power.  The constituent power 
operates pursuant to the logic of the political, not the legal, for they 
make and legitimatize law.  In the nineteenth-century international legal 
theory, law cannot regulate sovereignty.  Secession can only become a 
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right when sovereignty is canceled and the autonomy of the political is 
erased.  It can be so when the state becomes a system of pure law 
without sovereign exceptions.  Secession appears in a domain between 
law and sovereignty.  It raises the question of the relationship of law to 
its underlying political legitimacy, putting into question the sovereignty 
that makes law.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Secession relied upon the very principle that inspired modern 
revolutions and justified republican governments – popular 
sovereignty.  The world waited to see whether the new state would 
give a free pass to secession, which seemed legitimate according to 
its own founding principles.  Before the War, the question whether 
the new democratic state could preserve its territorial unity was open.  
The answer was a bit surprising: it turned out that the new state was 
as concerned with its territorial unity as the old states, and even more 
sensitive to threats.  As Doyle put it, “America’s Civil War gave the 
world an alarming preview of both the possibility for national 
disintegration and the astonishing compulsion of modern nations to 
resist fragmentation.”201  
In 1998, Canada subjected the secession controversy into the 
judicial process.  The Canadian Supreme Court took up the issue, 
ruling that the Canadian government must negotiate with Quebec if 
the majority in Quebec supported separation in a referendum.202  
Secession, for both the government and the court, is a matter of law, 
not that of sovereignty.  It is a matter for negotiation, deliberation, 
and argument, not for revolution, sacrifice, and war.  Behind the 
scene, we can get a sense of the transformation of the relationship of 
law to sovereignty in the past two centuries: sovereignty, which 
involves secession and violence, is no longer separate from law; it is 
now regulated by law.  Yet the image of the American Civil War 
constantly reminds the world of the possibility of sovereign politics 
beyond law. 
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